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It is widely accepted that periods of financial turbulence
cause higher volatility on markets as investors tend to over-
react to negative information (Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold,
& Vega, 2007). Further, price jumps have been recognized
in the financial literature as a significant part of volatility since
the seminal Merton (1976). A price jump is understood as an
abrupt price change over a very short time that is related to a
broad range of market phenomena that cannot be connected to
a noisy Gaussian distribution (Lahaye, Laurent, & Neely,
2011; Lee, 2012; Zheng & Shen, 2008). However, so far
research is surprisingly scarce on how the distribution of price
jumps change during turbulent periods and whether its pattern
differs across mature and emerging financial markets. In this
paper we analyze price jumps in market indices reported byting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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behavior before and after the European debt crisis unfolded.
The financial literature considers a number of ways to
classify market volatility. For our analysis the most important
aspect is the decomposition of volatility into regular noise (the
Gaussian-like component) and price jumps.1 The literature
supports two main explanations of the source of price jumps.
First, price jumps can reflect the market reaction to unexpected
information, which indicates that news announcements are the
primary source of price jumps (Lahaye et al., 2011; Lee &
Mykland, 2008). Second, Bouchaud, Kockelkoren, and
Potters (2006) and Joulin, Lefevre, Grunberg, and Bouchaud
(2008) advocate that jumps are mainly caused by a local
lack of liquidity on the market, an event they term “relative
liquidity.” In addition, an inefficient provision of liquidity
caused by an imbalanced market micro-structure can cause
extreme price movements as well (see the survey in Madhavan
(2000).
Hence, price jump identification is valuable for a number of
reasons. Price jumps can serve as a proxy for information
arrival and be utilized as tools for studying market efficiency
(Fama, 1970) or phenomena like information-driven trading;
see e.g., Cornell and Sirri (1992) or Kennedy, Sivakumar, and
Vetzal (2006). Further, non-Gaussian price movements influ-
ence the models and indicators employed in finance, such as
value-at-risk, or the performance of various financial vehicles
(Bates, 1996; Gatheral, 2006; Heston, 1993; Scott, 1997).
Also, a good knowledge of price jump distribution is poten-
tially useful for financial regulators to implement the most
optimal policies; see Becketti and Roberts (1990) or Tinic¸
(1995).
The financial literature identifies the key reason underlying
the importance of detecting price jumps: the presence of jumps
has serious consequences for financial risk management and
pricing. The recent literature offers empirical support of this
claim. Broadie and Jain (2008) show that the pricing of swaps
significantly differs when jumps are taken into account and
one cannot appropriately price risk while ignoring jumps.
Arshanapalli, Fabozzi, and Nelson (2013) support the need to
include the jump component into risk measures to estimate the
proper risk-return relationship. Carr and Wu (2010) use a jump
diffusion model to simultaneously price stock options and
credit default swaps and find a significant presence of the
interplay between credit and market risks. A similar confir-
mation of the change in the pricing mechanism was also
shown by Duffie, Pan, and Singleton (2000), Liu, Longstaff,
and Pan (2003), and Johannes (2004). Jarrow and Rosenfeld
(1984), Nietert, and Pan (2002) study pricing in the presence
of jumps and all of them confirm the presence of the jump risk
premium. Further, Caporin, Rossi, and Santucci de Magistris
(2011) analyze even the presence of price jumps in1 This separation can be seen in the first pioneering papers dealing with
price jumps (see e.g., Merton (1976) or a summary in Gatheral (2006)).
Recently, the division of the Gaussian-like component and price jumps was
used by Giot, Laurent, and Petitjean (2010). Although the original motivation
for this decomposition was of a purely mathematical nature, it can be advo-
cated by practitioners as well.volatility. Another strand of the literature identifies presence of
co-jumps and, for example, Li and Zhang (2013) show the
stronger co-jump behavior on the US and Chinese stock
markets since the subprime crisis.
Despite the importance of analyzing jumps, the literature
on jumps in European stock markets is rather limited.
Novotny´, Hanousek, and Kocenda (2013) analyze the behavior
and performance of multiple price jump indicators across
developed and emerging markets by employing high-
frequency stock market data from Japan, Germany, France,
the United Kingdom, the USA, the Czech Republic, Poland,
and Hungary. They identify clusters of price jump indicators
with similar performance and show that clusters differ in size
and are stable across stock market indices and over time. In
this respect the recent 2007e2008 financial crisis did not seem
to affect the overall jumpiness of mature or emerging stock
markets. Further, Hanousek, Kocenda, and Novotny´ (2013)
show that many price jumps identified on emerging Euro-
pean stock markets are due to foreign macroeconomic news.
Further, a significant transfer of price jumps from EU and U.S.
markets is also noted, with the latter having a stronger influ-
ence. Finally, Hanousek and Novotny (2013) analyze the
impact of the Lehman Brothers collapse on volatility and price
jumps in the US and Czech stock markets, and show only
limited reaction to this type of financial distress.
In this paper we analyze how the financial distress affects
the distribution and dynamics of price jumps on several stock
markets. The financial distress is represented by the European
debt crisis that fully unfolded in May 2010 and evolved into a
state where it was difficult or impossible for several Eurozone
member countries to repay or re-finance their government
debts without the assistance of third parties. We aim to analyze
the effect of this market-exogenous event on jump behavior
across markets. In particular, we aim to study to what extent
one can observe the similarities and transfers of price jumps
from developed capital markets to emerging stock markets in
Europe. Our choice to study both developed and emerging
capital markets in Europe is based on several reasons. First,
compared to other emerging stock markets, European
emerging markets do not suffer so much from potential eco-
nomic and political instability. Second, they are under the
strong influence of developed stock markets (Hanousek,
Kocenda, & Kutan, 2009; Horvath & Petrovski, 2013),
hence, the potential for influence is one-directional. In the end
we analyze data from developed stock markets in the UK and
Germany, while emerging markets are represented by the
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Croatia,
Slovenia, and Turkey. The emerging markets share several
common features: their overall liquidity and number of traded
stocks are rather small, the price formation mechanism is
under the strong influence of foreign news originating in
mature EU and US markets, and despite their smaller size, the
share of overall trading volume performed by foreign investors
in the emerging stock markets is substantial (Hanousek &
Kocenda, 2011).
The paper is structured as follows. First, we define price
jumps and connect them to the period of distress. Second, we
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sure intensity. We also formulate our testable hypotheses. In
Section 3 we describe our high-frequency data. We employ a
number of stock market indices and show that there is a sound
reason for potential price jump transfers and overall dynamics
between jumps originating in and transferred among countries.
Then we analyze the price jump patterns that materialized in
our selected stock market indices and analyze how the
behavior of price jumps changed after the European debt crisis
unfolded. The results of our analysis are presented in Section 5
along with specific policy implications. Finally, we summarize
the findings and implications in the concluding section.
2. Price jumps and European debt crisis
In this section, we provide a model of log-price dynamics
and formalize the effect of the financial distress due to the
European debt crisis in a model of volatility and in particular
of price jumps. Consequently, the identification of price jumps
is elaborated in detail.2.1. Price jumps2 A brief note about the Greek financial problems in this period: around
2000, the Greek economy had a large structural deficit along with fast growth.
However, the Greek economy was severely affected by the global financial
crisis, especially because global trade collapsed at the same time that tourism
declined. Greece responded with a pseudo-Keynesian plan to taking on huge
government debt to support economic performance. Unfortunately, markets
reacted negatively to this plan, worried about the negative consequences of
such debt as the debt grew more rapidly than expected. The debt problem
resulted in Greece not able to borrow on the open market. A loan of 45 billion
Euro was requested by Greece from the IMF and EU in April 2010 just to keep
basic government operations going, and this request itself plunged Greece’s
government bonds to below investment grade. Soon after, in May 2010, the
Greek government responded to public protest by announcing a series of
austerity measures and admitting the difficulty of the situation. For more in-
formation, see IMF (2012), Malkoutzis (2011), and Nechio (2010).Generally, a price jump is understood as an abrupt price
movement that is very large when compared to the current
market situation. The advantage of this definition is that it is
model-independent: it does not require any specific underlying
price-generating process. On the other hand, this definition is
too general and rather vague and hence not useful for any
statistical inference or testing. Therefore, we formalize the
general approach by assuming that the log-price Y ¼ {Yt}0t1
is defined on the probability space ðU;F; fFtg0t1;PÞ over
time interval [0,1]. The log-price process is a semi-martingale
and its dynamics in continuous time can be specified by the
stochastic differential equation
dSt ¼ mt dtþ st dWt þ dJt; ð1Þ
where mt and st are processes driving the drift and volatility,
dWt is a standard Brownian motion and the term dJt represents
the pure jump Levy process; see, for example, Merton (1976)
or Jacod and Shiryaev (1987). In the following, we consider
finite activity jumps (Aı¨t-Sahalia & Jacod, 2011) and factorize
the Levy processes as YtdNt. The first component corresponds
to a random process driving the magnitude of price jumps,
while the latter one drives the arrival.
For the arrival process, we assume that the jumps arrive at
finite activity. Therefore, the arrival process dNt takes a value
of 0 or 1 and can be expressed as dNt¼ E[dltjIt], where the
instantaneous intensity dlt is time dependent and may depend
on the exogenous economic variables and It is the information
set available up to time t. In this paper, we focus on the long-
term variation in the levels of intensity at a particular sampling
of the data dt. We therefore define the average intensity l½0;T
¼
Z T
0
dlt ¼
Z T
0
E½dNt with the meaning of the probability of
a price jump arrival being at any time step dt out of the interval[0,T]. The average intensity captures the long-term variation in
the probability of price jump arrivals while it smooths out the
fact that price jumps arrivals are rare events and thus most of
the time there are no arrivals.2.2. Financial distress: European debt crisisThe global financial crisis in 2008 emerged as a conse-
quence of excessive lending in the US debt market. The
consequences of this crisis transferred to the European conti-
nent where the increased sensitivity to risk uncovered the
structural fiscal problems of many European economies.
Hence, following the worsened global economic development
during 2008e2009, the European debt crisis evolved into a
situation where it was difficult or impossible for several
Eurozone member countries to repay or re-finance their gov-
ernment debts without the assistance of third parties. The
situation was made even worse by the undercapitalization and
liquidity problems of Eurozone banks. As a side effect, the
crisis also exerted a major political impact on many European
countries. Therefore, in this study, we explicitly focus on the
European debt crisis that fully unfolded in May 2010.
This event was not by its nature preceded by a drop in
capital markets. We therefore consider this event an exoge-
nous trigger with the potential to affect capital markets. To
understand the impact of a financial event like this, we
associate the distressed period with a structural break in the
sample. The distress period begins on May 1, 2010 and ends
on June 30, 2013. From a technical point of view the begin-
ning date coincides with the date when the Greek government
announced a series of austerity measures in order to receive an
external loan from the rest of the Eurozone and the IMF worth
110 billion euro, payable in three years at a 5.5% interest rate
(Lane, 2012).2 Other actions with respect to other Eurozone
countries followed later on. In general, the period after May
2010 is characterized by the contagion of financial risk,
increased volatility, and financial distress. This motivates us to
choose May 1, 2010 as an exogenous breakpoint, since it is
when the European debt crisis fully appeared and affected the
performance and behavior of individual European stock
markets.
To capture financial distress formally, i.e. following the data-
generating process assumed in equation (1), we define the
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takes a value of one during financial distress and zero otherwise.
First, the stylized facts suggest that spot volatility st will be
a function of Ft with the following effect:
st ¼ stðFtÞ with E½stðFtÞjFt ¼ 1>E½stðFtÞjFt ¼ 0; ð2Þ
which in plain English means that the expected spot volatility
during the distress period is strictly bigger than that during
usual market conditions. Second, the distress period will have
an effect on the price jump term as well. There are two
possible channels how distress can impact the price jump term
YtdJt:
Yt ¼ YtðFtÞ with E½YtðFtÞjFt ¼ 1>E½YtðFtÞjFt ¼ 0;
dJt ¼ dJtðltðFtÞÞ with E½ltðFtÞjFt ¼ 1>E½ltðFtÞjFt ¼ 0;
ð3Þ
where the first line means that the magnitude of price jumps
increases during distress, while the second line tells us that
rate of price jumps increases during distress without influ-
encing the magnitude. The effect of financial distress
expressed in equations (2) and (3) reflects the obvious intui-
tion: financial distress increases market volatility as well as the
rate and significance of rare and substantial price movements
(price jumps). One can measure the arrival of price jumps by
their average intensity as
l½0;T ¼ Njumps
Njumps þNnonjumps ; ð4Þ
where Njumps and Nnon-jumps denotes the number of jumps and
the number of non-jumps, respectively, over a given time in-
terval [0,T].3
We employ two different methods for the identification of
price jumps (defined in detail in the methodology section) and
aim to verify the intuition related to the price jump term; in
particular, that we observe different intensities of price jumps
during financial distress. For that purpose, we need to define
the distress period exogenously and hence we use the Euro-
pean debt crisis as an exogenous factor defining the distressed
period. Later, we will use equations (2)e(4) and different
identifications of price jumps to statistically analyze to what
extent we observe significant differences in the volatility and
jump process during the financial distress period.
The dependence of the diffusive and price jump terms on
the risk factor Ft allows us to analyze the changes in the price
jump intensities across different markets. Our distress model
does not contain any explicit correlation across markets since
we do not aim to model the immediate response of price jumps3 Definition (4) is an empirical counterpart of the theoretical considerations
mentioned in equation (1). In particular, because of the discrete character of
the price jump process, the average intensity defined in equation (4) corre-
sponds to the original definition l[0,T]¼ E[dNt]. Originally (the theoretical
definition of) intensity corresponds to the probability of price jump arrival at
time step dt in the interval [0,T], In equation (4) the meaning remains the
same. It is an estimate of the proportion, i.e., of the probability of jump
occurrence in the interval [0,T].in one market to another as was done by Aı¨t-Sahalia, Cacho-
Diaz, and Laeven (2010). Rather, we use high-frequency data
to describe the change in market regimes due to financial
distress, where the driver of the distress is believed to be
exogenous to the markets and any correlation is therefore
realized through the distress factor. Our model framework thus
resembles the approach in the Mixed Data Sampling (MIDAS)
literature; see Ghysels, Sinko, and Valkanov (2007). It is worth
noting that this methodology can be reverted to identify the
distress period. Thus, by assuming that the distress period is
defined as a regime with increased volatility and increased
price jump arrival, or, alternatively, an increased contribution
of price jumps to the overall market volatility, we may devise
an algorithm to search for a period where these conditions are
significantly satisfied. For the purpose of this analysis, how-
ever, we work with the exogenously given distress period.
3. Methodology
In this section, we describe how to test the impact of the
European debt crisis on the price-generating process with a
special focus on price jumps. In our analysis we employ two
different approaches for price jump detection. Method 1,
devised by Lee and Mykland (2008), primarily aims to isolate
price jumps using integrated variance. Method 2, suggested by
Aı¨t-Sahalia and Jacod (2009), is based on the detection of
extreme returns using percentiles. Both methods also differ in
the way they identify price jumps from a purely statistical
perspective. In this sense, we employ two methods that can be
linked to two extreme cases with respect to hypothesis testing
and were identified in a large simulation study in Hanousek,
Kocenda, and Novotny´ (2012). Specifically, Method 2 is iden-
tified as a Type-I Error-Optimal indicator that maximizes the
identification of true price jumps. Method 1 can be understood
as a Type-II Error-Optimal indicator, whichminimizes incorrect
price jump identification.4 In other words, in our analysis Type-I
error identification (Method 2) would capture both price jumps
and the volatility structure, while Type-II error identification
(Method 1) would target primarily the price jumps.
In order to study the effects of the European debt crisis on
stock market behavior we will compare the intensities of
detected price jumps over different periods and markets. We
introduce the form of both methods below.3.1. Method 1: integrated-variance-based methodIn order to estimate the key variable of this paper, the
average intensity l[0,T], we have to date and count the total
number of price jump arrivals over time interval [0,T]. For that
purpose, we employ the Lee and Mykland (2008) test statistics
given as4 In the literature, the Type-I error criterion is known as optimization with
respect to the power of the test; in diagnostic analysis it is usually called the
optimization of the positiveenegative probability. Similarly, Type-II error
optimality is usually presented as optimality with respect to the size of the test,
while in diagnostic analysis it is typically called the optimization of the false-
negative probability.
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IVt
p ; ð5Þ
where rt is a log-return and IVt is an instantaneous integrated
variance, which captures the variance of st dWt while
neglecting the contribution from dJt. Then, the test itself is
based on the variable xn, which is defined as
maxt˛An jLtj Cn
Sn
/xn; ð6Þ
where An is the tested region with n observations and Cn and Sn
are parameters depending on n only as specified in Lee &
Mykland (2008). This statistics was found in a large simulation
study performed by Hanousek et al. (2012) as being the optimal
price jump indicator with respect to Type-II error. This method
minimizes the probability of the false detection of jumps.
To estimate the integrated variance, we use Andersen,
Dobrev, and Schaumburg (2012)’s median-based method, for
which the estimator for IVt is given as
IVt ¼MedRVt
¼ p
6 4 ﬃﬃﬃ3p þp
n
n 2
Xn1
i¼2
medðjrtiþ1j; jrtijjrti1jÞ2; ð7Þ
where n denotes the number of past returns in the window to
estimate the integrated variance for the return rt.3.2. Method 2: detecting price jumps using extreme
returnsAı¨t-Sahalia and Jacod (2009) defined types of jump indicator
where the price process is assumed to be decomposed into the
Gaussian component corresponding to normal (white) noise and
the non-homogenous Poisson component corresponding to price
jumps. Therefore, when a significant price jump appears, the
price increment is dominated by the non-homogenous Poisson
element. On the other hand, when the price movements are
governed solely byGaussian noise, the average and/ormaximum
magnitudes of such increments can be estimated. Therefore, one
can use these properties and set a threshold value that will
effectively distinguish the two components, i.e. predict jumps.
Let us assume that the underlying price increment (DS )
process is given as DS ¼ sDX þ DJ, where the price incre-
ment is defined as DS ¼ St  St1, and further assume that we
observe the realization of prices in equidistant time steps Dt.
In this definition, X corresponds to a Brownian motion and J to
a b-stable process. The increments of the two components can
be expressed as DX ¼ (Dt)½X1 and DJ ¼ (Dt)1/bJ1 with
equalities in distribution.
The different magnitudes in the two components can be
used to discriminate between the noise components and the
big price jumps coming solely from the J-process.5 The big5 The J-process contributes to a large amount of small price jumps; however,
we want to focus on big price jumps only. The goal is not to completely
determine the properties of the J-process but rather to determine how to
discriminate extreme price movements.price jumps cause DS ¼ DJ (in distribution) with X having a
negligible effect, while in the presence of no big price jumps,
which is most of the time, DS ¼ s(Dt)½X1. Therefore, we can,
for a given Dt, choose a threshold value equal to a(Dt)g, with
a > 0 and g ˛ (0,½), such that if DS f (Dt)g then DS is at a
given moment dominated by J with a certain probability.
This argument can be reverted: Assuming the knowledge of
the rate of the arrival of big jumps, we can imply a corre-
sponding threshold using centiles. Centiles, therefore, serve as
a prior to form a threshold for discriminating price jumps from
the noise. The standard approach is (Aı¨t-Sahalia & Jacod,
2009) to decompose these processes by employing appro-
priate threshold levels, or certain percentiles, of the distribu-
tion of returns observed over the entire sample. We employ the
99.5th/0.5th centiles as the upper/lower thresholds and define
price jumps as those returns that are higher/lower than a given
upper/lower centile.
Method 2 for price jump identification maximizes the
probability of the correct price jump detection, and it is thus
optimal with respect to Type-I error. However, there is a
chance that it may suffer from the overidentification of price
jumps: almost any period with an extreme return is identified
as a jump, even if the extreme value is driven by increased
market volatility.3.3. HypothesesIn this paper, we aim to answer the following questions:
Question A. Is the intensity of price jumps on financial
markets different following the European debt crisis?
Question B. Is the homogeneity of financial markets with
respect to price jump intensity different following the Eu-
ropean debt crisis?
The first question is based on the intuition that an extreme
event such as the European debt crisis would result in an
increase in overall volatility as well as an increase in the
number of extreme price movements that would result in a
greater intensity of jump occurrence. In the second question,
we explicitly ask whether the European debt crisis caused a
change in the distribution of price jumps, for example a
higher variability in the arrival rate of price jumps and in-
tensity. This means that during financial distress, we are
likely to observe days with an extremely high rate of price
jump arrivals, while there can be days that are rather calm as
well.
To answer the above-mentioned questions we use the cor-
responding statistically testable hypotheses. First, we divide
the sample of trading days into two sub-samples correspond-
ing to periods of standard market conditions and financial
distress. Then, we use the daily figures of arrived price jumps
and form the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis A. H0: The mean of price jump intensity for the
two sub-samples, i.e., during and not during distress, is the
same.
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estimated number of price jumps changes during the crisis. For
that we employ the two-sample Wilcoxon test, which is a non-
parametric test comparing whether two observed samples
come from the same distribution (Mann & Whitney, 1947;
Wilcoxon, 1945). Here we test whether the estimated price
jump measures for the two sub-samples come from the same
distribution. The observations in each of the two sub-samples
is combined into one sample and then ranked. The z-statistic is
composed based on the mutual comparison of ranks between
the two samples. For large samples, the z-statistic follows a
standard normal distribution; 20 and above observations is
usually sufficient (see Mann & Whitney, 1947; Wilcoxon,
1945). The null hypothesis of the test states that both
observed samples come from the same distribution or there is
no significant asymmetry in the rankings for the two groups.
When the calculated z-statistics exceeds the critical value, we
reject the null hypothesis. In addition, the sign of the z-sta-
tistics can suggest the position of the medians of the two
compared samples.
Hypothesis B. H0: The variance in the jump intensity of the
two sub-samples, i.e., during and not during distress, is
unchanged.
This test asks the question whether the trading days in
either of the two sub-samples were on average more heter-
ogenous. In other words, this procedure tests the heterogeneity
of the trading days between the sub-samples. To answer the
question we employ the standard F-test and compare whether
the variance of the estimated price jump measures changed
during the crisis. The F-test is defined as
S2C
S2NoC
wFðNC  1;NNoC  1Þ; ð8Þ
where S2 is the standard deviation of the characteristic coef-
ficient calculated during the crisis “C” and not during the crisis
“No-C”. NC is the number of days the crisis lasts and NNo-C is
the complement to the total number of days in the sample.
We aim to test these two hypotheses for different markets.
In particular, we plan to analyze how price jumps in a
developed capital market compare with emerging EuropeanTable 1
Market capitalization and turnover of analyzed stock markets.
Stock exchange (country) Stock market capitalization
2008 2010
London (United Kingdom) 69.9% 137.7%
Frankfurt (Germany) 30.6% 43.5%
Budapest (Hungary) 12.0% 21.5%
Prague (Czech Republic) 21.7% 21.7%
Warsaw (Poland) 17.0% 40.5%
Bucharest (Romania) 9.7% 19.7%
Zagreb (Croatia) 38.5% 42.3%
Ljubljana (Slovenia) 21.6% 20.1%
Istanbul (Turkey) 16.1% 41.9%
Note: data were obtained from the World Bank database and accessed on Septem
variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source¼world-development-indicators.markets, and also how price jumps transfer from one to the
other. Focusing on two types of markets allows us to study
changes in the price jump distribution in terms of the differ-
ences between these markets and compare the states of each
market both before and after the distress.4. Data description
Developed European markets are represented by the UK
and Germany, while emerging markets in Central and South-
Eastern Europe are represented by the Czech Republic,
Poland, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, and Turkey. We
used the maximum country-data coverage for the available
high-frequency stock market data. The other countries in the
regions studied either do not have enough liquidity to consider
high-frequency trading or their intraday data are not available
at all.
We employ high-frequency (5-min interval) data of realized
prices for each of the market indexes. Data from all stock
exchanges e except the Borsa Istanbul e cover the period
from January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2013 and thus cover a suf-
ficiently long enough period before and after the European
debt crisis. High-frequency data for the Istanbul Stock ex-
change were available to us only for the period July 1, 2011 to
June 30, 2013, which provides still enough data for similarity
and response analyses.
The key characteristics of the markets and indices under
research are presented in Table 1. We show the market capi-
talization and turnover ratio on each market at the beginning
of our research span (in 2008) and one year before its end (in
2012). We also provide data for the year when the European
debt crisis unfolded (in mid-2010). There is overwhelming
evidence that until the crisis the market capitalization rose but
dropped afterward; exceptions are Prague, where market
capitalization is the same in 2008 and 2010 and Ljubljana,
where market capitalization decreases over time. We can also
witness a drop in the turnover ratio on the markets under
research; exceptions are Bucharest and Ljubljana that record
increases.
For our analysis we use the following set of indices with the
corresponding tickers. For the European developed markets
we use:Turnover ratio
2012 2008 2010 2012
124.0% 227.2% 101.9% 84.0%
43.7% 193.3% 103.0% 91.8%
16.8% 93.0% 94.5% 54.6%
19.0% 70.4% 29.4% 27.0%
36.3% 45.7% 47.6% 42.6%
9.4% 11.3% 5.4% 11.5%
38.2% 7.4% 4.1% 2.3%
14.2% 6.9% 2.6% 6.2%
39.1% 118.5% 158.4% 136.5%
ber 23, 2013. The database is at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/
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capitalization-weighted index) of the 100 most highly
capitalized companies traded on the London Stock
Exchange.6
 Ticker DAX that stands for the German (total return)
Stock Index of 30 selected German blue chip stocks traded
on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The equities use free-
float shares in the index calculation.7
Emerging markets are represented by the following indices/
tickers:
 Ticker BUX is the capitalization-weighted (total return)
index adjusted for free float. The index tracks the daily
price performance of large, actively traded shares on the
Budapest Stock Exchange.8
 Ticker PX stands for the official index of the Prague Stock
Exchange, a capitalization-weighted index based on the
free float of all members.9
 Ticker WIG, the Warsaw Stock Exchange index, is a total
return index that includes dividends and pre-emptive rights
(subscription rights).10
 Ticker BET, the Bucharest Exchange Trading Index, is a
capitalization-weighted index, comprised of the 10 most
liquid stocks listed on the BSE tier 1. The index is a price
index and was developed with a base value of 1000 as of
September 22, 1997.
 Ticker CRO represents CROBEX, which is a capitalization-
weighted index designed tomeasure the pricemovements of
shares listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange.11
 Ticker SBITOP stands for the Slovenian blue chip index. It
is a free-float capitalization-weighted index comprising
the most liquid shares traded at Ljubljana Stock
Exchange.126 The equities use investability weighting in the index calculation. Invest-
ability weighting gives a weight in the index based on a free float according to
the following bands:Free float less than or equal to 15%¼ ineligible*Free float
greater than 15% but less than or equal to 20%¼ 20%Free float greater than
20% but less than or equal to 30%¼ 30%Free float greater than 30% but less
than or equal to 40%¼ 40%Free float greater than 40% but less than or equal
to 50%¼ 50%Free float greater than 50% but less than or equal to 75%¼ 75%
Free float greater than 75%¼ 100%The index was developed with a base level
of 1000 as of January 3, 1984 (source: Bloomberg, London Stock Exchange).
7 The DAX has a base value of 1,000 as of December 31, 1987. As of June
18, 1999 only XETRA equity prices are used to calculate all DAX indices.
8 The BUX index accounts for 58% of the domestic equity market capi-
talization. BUX has a base value of 1000 points as of January 2, 1991.
9 The index was calculated for the first time on March 20, 2006 when it
replaced the PX50 and PX-D indices. The index took over the historical values
of the PX50 index. The starting date was April 5, 1994 with a base of 1000
points. As of September 24, 2012, the composition fully reflects the free float
of members due to methodology changes.
10 The index includes all companies listed on the main market, excluding
foreign companies and investment funds. The index base value is 1000 as of
April 16, 1991.
11 It is capped at a maximum 20% weighting of the index capitalization.
CROBEX was developed with a base level of 1000 beginning September 1,
1997.
12 Each stock’s weighting is capped at 30%. The index was developed with a
base level of 1000 as of March 31, 2006. Ticker XU100 is used for the Borsa Istanbul National 100
Index, which is a capitalization-weighted index composed
of National Market companies except investment trusts.13
The general data characteristics are described in Table 2. Data
for the covered stocked market indices (analyzed at a 5-min
frequency) shows on average low negative returnswith relatively
small deviation. In the majority of cases the realized skewness is
negative, which means that the distribution of returns have a
fatter left tail, or in other words, that extreme movements down
(large negative returns) tend to bemore likely. Kurtosis is clearly
higher than 3, which means that distributions of returns are fat-
tailed (leptokurtic).14 Further, the number of detected jumps is
relatively large and is naturally higher for Method 2, which ac-
counts not only for jumps but also heightened volatility.
5. Results
For testing the difference in the intensity of the price
jumps we employ the Wilcoxon sign test. For Type-I Error-
Optimal identification (Method 2) we see a clear pattern
indicating that we observe higher jump intensity during the
European debt crisis. The situation is reversed when we
employ the Type-II Error-Optimal indicator for the detection
of price jumps (Method 1). The main difference is that when
we minimize the probability of incorrect jump identification
(Type-II error), we see that the jump intensity did not
dramatically increase during the period of financial distress.
This discrepancy could be caused by an overall increase in
market volatility without an unnecessary increase in the rate
of price jumps. Because jump prediction minimizing the
Type-I error uses centiles (i.e., is based on outliers), such a
method could incorrectly identify a lot of false jumps during
a volatile period.5.1. Jump intensitiesIn Tables 3 and 4 we present a pair-wise comparison of the
jump intensities across the stock markets under research.
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the Wilcoxon test on jump
intensities obtained based on Methods 1 and 2, respectively.
Each column in each table is divided into two sub-columns: in
the left sub-column we present the results from before the
European debt crisis in May 2010 while the right sub-column
shows the results afterward. Individual entries in each table
show the extent of intensity in price jumps between pairs of
stock markets that are labeled by the names of the cities where
stock exchanges operate. An entry (value of the z-statistics) in
each table should be read in the following way: a positive
(negative) number shows that price jump intensity on the13 The constituents are selected on the basis of pre-determined criteria for the
companies to be included in the indices. The base date is January 1986 and the
base value is 1 for the TL-based price.
14 The null hypothesis stating that returns are i.i.d. following the normal
distribution (JarqueeBera (Jarque & Bera, 1980) statistics) implies a rejection
of the null hypothesis at a very high confidence level, where the p-value does
not exceed 0.0001 in any case.
Table 2
Summary statistics for stock market index returns.
Stock exchange Number of observations Characteristics based on a 5-min frequency
Mean return Skewness Kurtosis Number of jumps
detected
Number of
jumps per day
Whole period Whole period Whole period (1) (2) (1) (2)
London 139,260 2.11E06 1.25 134.5 800 1392 0.58 1.01
Frankfurt 145,248 3.14E06 0.06 23.1 682 1452 0.49 1.04
Budapest 128,847 9.79E06 0.40 40.8 689 1288 0.50 0.94
Prague 116,048 1.60E05 1.45 68.4 1374 1160 0.99 0.84
Warsaw 129,173 7.13E06 0.16 20.0 905 1292 0.66 0.94
Bucharest 79,421 1.10E05 0.35 55.9 711 794 0.51 0.57
Zagreb 85,500 1.90E05 0.08 505.7 731 854 0.53 0.62
Ljubljana 38,567 2.00E05 0.77 64.4 803 386 0.59 0.28
Istanbul 39,586 2.40E06 0.14 23.8 125 396 0.23 0.72
Note: columns denoted as (1) correspond to Method 1 for jump detection (integrated variance), while columns marked as (2) represent the results obtained for
Method 2 (centile based). The different number of observations is mostly related to the different hours of operation. For example, while the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange opens at 9 a.m. and closes at 5:30 p.m., the Ljubljana Stock Exchange opens at 9:30 a.m. at and closes at 1 p.m.; for continuous trading the open market
session runs only from 9:30 a.m. to 12:50 p.m.
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intensity on the market in a given column. Alternatively, a
negative number can be interpreted as a stock market in a
given column exhibiting greater price jump intensity than a
stock market in a given row. The larger the coefficient, the
larger is the difference in jump intensity between the two
markets. This interpretation can be illustrated by a specific
example: in the left sub-column of Table 3 the Frank-
furteLondon pair-wise result is 1.77, which means that
Frankfurt stock exchange exhibits smaller intensity in jumps
of its index (DAX) than does London Stock Exchange; how-
ever, the difference in jump intensities on both markets is not
very large.Table 3
Pair-wise testing for the equality of mean jump intensities (Method 1, using integ
Stock exchange London Frankfurt
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis C
Frankfurt 1.77b 3.21a
Budapest 1.52c 0.06 0.32
Prague 5.52a 7.46a 5.98a
Warsaw 1.28c 4.28a 2.98a
Bucharest 2.87a 4.87a 4.42a
Zagreb 2.62a 4.07a 4.13a
Ljubljana 6.42a 7.29a 6.42a
Istanbul N/A 4.27a N/A 
Stock exchange Warsaw Bucharest
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis C
Frankfurt
Budapest
Prague
Warsaw
Bucharest 1.74b 2.82a
Zagreb 1.34c 2.42a 0.36
Ljubljana 6.42a 6.63a 6.36a
Istanbul N/A 5.56a N/A 
Note: the table contains the results of the Wilcoxon test (z-statistics, normally dis
means that the stock market shown in a row has lower (higher) jump intensity than t
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.From Table 3 a pattern emerges: price jump intensity is
different before and after the European debt crisis unfolded. In
most cases the jump intensity increased during the crisis but
several anomalies are present. As we already reported in our
illustrative example above, the jump intensity before the crisis
is smaller on the Frankfurt stock exchange than on the London
exchange (1.77; left sub-column) and even increases after-
ward (3.21; right sub-column). Emerging stock markets
almost uniformly exhibit larger intensity in jumps than both
developed markets and the magnitude of the intensity is also
greater. Out of the emerging stock markets only the Budapest
stock exchange exhibits lower intensity than London during
both periods (1.52 and 0.06) but not with respect torated variance).
Budapest Prague
risis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
2.85a
7.41a 6.03a 7.38a
5.23a 2.95a 3.88a 5.11a 6.68a
5.51a 4.31a 4.79a 3.92a 3.53a
5.10a 4.16a 4.06a 3.92a 3.22a
7.35a 6.42a 7.20a 6.06a 3.39a
2.98a N/A 4.10a N/A 6.74a
Zagreb Ljubljana
risis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
0.03
5.16a 6.34a 4.91a
5.99a N/A 5.59a N/A 6.66a
tributed) of the equality of jump intensities. Negative (positive) test statistics
he market shown in the column. Superscript letters a, b, and c denote statistical
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during the crisis period shows lower jump intensity than
developed (4.26 and 2.98 with respect to London and
Frankfurt, respectively; right sub-column) and the rest of the
emerging stock markets. Another feature stands out: the
magnitude of the jump intensity during the European debt
crisis period is highest on the Prague and Ljubljana stock
markets that also exhibit higher jump intensity than other
markets (right sub-column). The feature is less pronounced
during the pre-crisis period (left sub-column), though.
In Table 4 we present the results of the Wilcoxon test on
price jump intensities derived by Method 2. There is not much
inter-period change found for the FrankfurteLondon pair
(0.93 and 0.76 for pre-crisis and crisis periods, respec-
tively) and also the behavior of the Prague stock market with
respect to both developed markets seems quite stable (0.46 vs.
0.61 for the PragueeLondon pair; 1.16 vs. 1.08 for the Pra-
gueeFrankfurt pair). On the other hand, the effect of the
European debt crisis can be seen on the pairs of the rest of the
emerging markets as the intensities of price jumps in Buda-
pest, Warsaw, Bucharest, Zagreb, and Ljubljana do change
with respect to other markets during the crisis period. Further,
these intensities for many pairs switch signs. For example, the
Warsaw and Bucharest markets exhibited higher intensity of
jumps than other markets before the crisis, but during the crisis
period both markets show chiefly lower intensity of jumps
than the rest of the markets. The Istanbul stock market exhibits
the opposite pattern during the post-crisis period as it shows
higher jump intensity than all the other stock markets with the
single exception of a lower jump intensity than the market in
Ljubljana (2.81; right sub-column). This finding indicates
that when volatility is accounted for in price jump identifica-
tion, the Istanbul stock market exhibits remarkable sensitivity
to the European debt crisis.
It is also interesting to note that the very high magnitude of
the jump intensity on the Prague market with respect to other
markets detected by Method 1 (Table 3) disappeared when
Method 2 was used. Only the Ljubljana market exhibits
markedly higher intensity of price jumps than the rest of both
developed and emerging markets during both periods (Table
4). The reason for this peculiar behavior might lie in the fact
that the Ljubljana stock exchange is opened only a few hours
each day for trading. For continuous trading the open market
session runs only from 9:30 a.m. to 12:50 p.m. Naturally, in
terms of information flow, the market aims to capture whatever
happened before opening and take positions with respect to the
future before closing. However, the short trading interval
means that all this has to be done at a much faster pace than on
other markets. Potentially higher nervousness and uncertainty
might be behind the markedly different price jump intensity
behavior on the Ljubljana market. The result is quite robust as
it is captured by both methods.
Another interesting finding is represented by the visibly
lowered jump intensity on the Warsaw stock market detected
by Method 2 during the crisis period (Table 4, right sub-
column). An explanation for this behavior should be sought
behind the institutional set-up of the Polish financial market.Polish investment funds usually hold up to 40% of their assets
in stocks: when stock prices rise (decrease) the same stocks
are sold (bought) to keep the value of assets in balance. This
process helps to smooth and lower market volatility. In other
words, it does not prevent jumps but helps to avoid extreme
returns. For that reason we can see mostly higher jump in-
tensity of the Warsaw stock market during the crisis period
with respect to other markets detected by Method 1 (Table 3,
right sub-column) but lower jump intensity when volatility is
accounted for (Table 4, right sub-column).5.2. Differences in jump intensities and volatilityIn Table 5 we present additional results that supplement our
findings presented earlier in Tables 3 and 4. First, we formally
test hypothesis A whether the (mean of) the jump intensity
differs in the two periods under research. When we consider
Method 1, the values of the z-statistics of the Wilcoxon test
reveal that jump intensities are not different between periods
for the whole group or individual markets (Table 5; Method 1).
The single exception is the Ljubljana stock market for which
we can safely assert that jump intensities are different in both
periods. Specifically, with the help of Table 4, we can see that
the jump intensity on the Ljubljana stock market was high and
about the same with respect to other markets but during the
crisis period it increased and decreased with respect to other
markets in about the same proportions. When we consider
Method 2 the results change dramatically. Values of the z-
statistics show that jump intensities during both periods are
markedly different (Table 5; Method 2). If we consult Table 4
again we can see that the difference in jump intensities do
depend on the market pairs that exhibit an intensity increase or
decrease without a firm pattern. Ljubljana is again an excep-
tion as it shows a uniformly huge increase in jump intensity
with respect to all markets. We can sum up our supplementary
findings in the following way. Our results indicate that jump
intensity did not change in between periods when only jumps
are considered. However, when the results of Method 2 are
considered, volatility increased substantially but dramatic
movements in values of indices did not. Hence, during the
European debt crisis, the intensity of jumps did not increase
but the uncertainty associated with the crisis transferred (only)
to increased volatility.
Second, we present the results of the test for Hypothesis B
of variance equalities for the two periods. To assess it, we
employ the F-test specified in (12). Table 6 reports the results
of the test for both methods. We present two pieces of infor-
mation for every test. First, we decide whether we can reject
the null of the equality of variances at a given confidence level
with respect to a two-sided alternative hypothesis. If we are
able to reject the null hypothesis, then we further provide an
indicator whether the variance was higher (>) or lower (<) in
the period before the crisis when compared to the period of the
European debt crisis.
For Method 1, we see that when all markets are taken
together the variance significantly differs during the two pe-
riods. In particular, the variance of monthly intensities was
Table 4
Pair-wise testing for the equality of mean jump intensities (Method 2, using extreme values, i.e., centiles).
Stock exchange London Frankfurt Budapest Prague
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
Frankfurt 0.93 0.76
Budapest 1.13 0.34 0.69 0.48
Prague 0.46 0.61 1.16 1.08 0.70 1.53c
Warsaw 0.92 2.42a 1.62c 1.76b 1.10 0.81 0.43 2.98a
Bucharest 1.31c 1.21 2.16b 0.59 1.36c 0.13 0.51 1.46c
Zagreb 1.13 0.22 1.79b 0.34 1.44c 0.78 0.54 0.43
Ljubljana 2.9a 4.79a 1.97b 4.56a 2.30b 4.41a 2.89a 4.77a
Istanbul N/A 1.27 N/A 1.51c N/A 1.87b N/A 1.21
Stock exchange Warsaw Bucharest Zagreb Ljubljana
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
Frankfurt
Budapest
Prague
Warsaw
Bucharest 0.07 0.96
Zagreb 0.25 1.99b 0.11 0.88
Ljubljana 3.39a 5.11a 3.59a 4.91a 3.56a 5.44a
Istanbul N/A 2,47a N/A 1.79b N/A 1.61c N/A 2,81a
Note: the table contains the results of the Wilcoxon test (z-statistics, normally distributed) of the equality of jump intensities. Negative (positive) test statistics
means that the stock market shown in a row has lower (higher) jump intensity than the market shown in the column. Superscript letters a, b, and c denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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This finding indicates also a higher variance in the jump-
arrival process. The crisis therefore served as an element that
homogenized the behavior of extreme price jump arrivals. In
addition, a similar pattern is seen for the London market, while
other markets do not show a significant difference between the
two periods. The single difference is identified in Zagreb that
shows the opposite behavior, albeit not as significant as in the
London case. This suggests that the London Stock Exchange is
the main driver of the difference between the two periods. ThisTable 5
Testing for the equality of the jump intensities before and during the crisis
(after May 1, 2010).
Method 1 Method 2
Stock market
London 1.01 4.24a
Frankfurt 1.26 3.51a
Budapest 0.84 3.58a
Prague 0.21 3.97a
Warsaw 0.31 5.15a
Bucharest 0.90 5.25a
Zagreb 0.99 4.99a
Ljubljana 3.66a 3.57a
All markets 0.55 8.39a
Note: the row marked “All markets” does not contain data from the Istanbul
stock exchange, because of missing data for the pre-crisis period. A negative
(positive) number for the test statistics corresponds to the situation when jump
intensity is lower (higher) before the financial crisis. Superscript letters a, b,
and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively. The column denoted as “Method 1” corresponds to the Method 1 for
jump detection (integrated variance), while the column marked as “Method 2”
represents the results obtained for Method 2 (centile based).evidence can be understood by the fact that London was
directly exposed to the US subprime mortgage crisis and post-
Lehman turmoil, which falls into the pre-European debt crisis
period. Therefore, the likely driver of the excessive variance
on London market originates from the spill-over of the distress
in the US in 2008.
Method 2 offers different insights as there is no lack of the
statistical significance. In this case, all individual markets asTable 6
Testing for the equality of the variances of jump intensities before and during
the crisis (after May 1, 2010).
Method 1 Method 2
Stock market
London 4.36a “>” 14.57a “>”
Frankfurt 1.42 6.99a “>”
Budapest 1.32 12.04a “>”
Prague 1.75 22.72a “>”
Warsaw 1.53 6.99a “>”
Bucharest 0.65 3.40a “>”
Zagreb 0.41b “<” 53.03a “>”
Ljubljana 0.60 0.43b “<”
All markets 1.485a “>” 7.85a “>”
Note: the row marked “All markets” does not contain data from the Istanbul
stock exchange, because of missing data for the pre-crisis period. Superscript
letters a, b, and c denote statistical significance the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively, for the two-sided alternative. Additionally, the sign “>” denotes
that the variance is higher in the period before the crisis, and the sign “<”
denotes that the variance is lower during the European debt crisis period. The
column denoted as “Method 1” corresponds to Method 1 for jump detection
(integrated variance), while the column marked as “Method 2” represents the
results obtained for Method 2 (centile based). We apply the classic F-test, with
a null hypothesis that the variances of jump intensities in two sub-periods are
equal (the corresponding critical values are F(27,37)).
Table 7
Pair-wise testing for the equality of mean jump intensities.
Developed markets Visegrad region SE markets Turkey
(Method 1, using integrated variance)
Developed markets
Visegrad region 5.98a
SE markets 7.97a 4.84a
Turkey 3.38a 5.90a 6.92a
(Method 2, using centiles)
Developed markets
Visegrad region 0.78
SE markets 2.16b 3.11a
Turkey 1.49c 2.07b 0.19
Note: the table contains the results of the Wilcoxon test (z-statistics, normally
distributed) of the equality of jump intensities. Negative (positive) test sta-
tistics means that the stock market shown in a row has lower (higher) jump
intensity than the market shown in the column. Superscript letters a, b, and c
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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significant differences between the two periods. In particular,
in all cases (with the single exception of Ljubljana) the vari-
ance of the price jump intensity is higher during the first
period before the European debt crisis emerged. This confirms
the sensitivity of Method 2 to the subprime mortgage crisis
and post-Lehman turmoil. Therefore, we can conclude that in
the ex-post analysis, Method 2 can lead us into a false sense of
the increased variance of the arrival processes, which origi-
nates from the over-volatile markets after the Lehman
Brothers collapse. Method 1, however, filters out the over-
volatile bias of Method 2 and accentuates the Lehman
Brothers’ effect only for the London market.
If we combine the results of hypothesis B testing based on
both methods we can conclude that with the exception of
London and Zagreb, the variance of the price jump intensity
could not be distinguished as different in the pre-crisis period
from that during the crisis.5.3. Turkey e brief case studyFinally, we aim to analyze the mutual relationship of the
Turkish stock market with the rest of our sample as a case
study. We apply the developed methodological framework
described in the previous sections. The purpose of this section
is to advocate quantitative results based on average intensity
and assess the level of economic and financial integration
(defined in terms of the spill-over of extreme events) of the
Istanbul stock exchange with respect to different European
markets.
We can split our sample into geographical regions: the two
developed markets (London, Frankfurt); the Visegrad markets
consisting of stock exchanges in Budapest, Warsaw, and Pra-
gue; the South European (SE) markets composed of stock
exchanges in Bucharest, Zagreb, and Ljubljana. Our aim is to
compare the Istanbul stock market with the three regions with
respect to price jump-arrival properties and thus to establish a
link with respect to the transmission of extreme events and
their reaction to the distress caused by the European debt
imbalances.
Table 7 presents a pair-wise comparison of the distribution
of monthly intensities between Turkey and the three regions
for both methods. In particular, we use only the overlapping
sample to have comparable data. First, Method 1 suggests that
the intensity of price jump arrivals on the Istanbul stock ex-
change is on average significantly smaller than any of the three
regions where the difference is lowest with respect to the
developed markets. Therefore, we may conclude that Istanbul
resembles by its price jump-arrival properties stable developed
markets rather than its counterparts in the SE and Visegrad
markets that are regionally and economically more similar to
Turkey. It may also suggest that Turkey is more affected by the
large and developed European markets and the information
spillovers flow from Europe mainly through the developed
markets. In other words, the regional events contained within
the boundaries of the SE and Visegrad markets do not have
enough power to reach Istanbul. Despite the fact that Istanbulstock exchange is in terms of volatility closest to the SE
markets, the similarity can be explained only through the
overall periods of increased volatility, which are most likely to
be driven by the existing European debt crisis. Moreover,
Method 2 is not able to deliver a strong message since the
difference in volatilities between Istanbul and the three other
regions is not statistically significant in many cases.
Based on our previous results we can draw some conclu-
sions. When perceived through the optics of the monthly price
jump-arrival intensity, the Istanbul stock exchange seems to be
closest to the developed markets. This suggests that the jump
intensity of the Turkish stock market is linked to Europe
through the main channel of the developed markets. Unfor-
tunately, we do not have pre-crisis high-frequency data from
the Borsa Istanbul. Therefore, we can use only the data from
the crisis period, during which the Turkish stock market differs
from other emerging European markets in terms of price jump
behavior and its dynamics.5.4. Policy implicationsOur results suggest the existence of different correlation
patterns in terms of extreme events. Based on this, we can
draw specific policy implications. From the perspective of
emerging-market investors, the Borsa Istanbul should be
considered a relatively independent capital market with unique
price dynamics. A global player investing part of his portfolio
in emerging European markets usually forms a basket of
similar assets and treats them in the same way across the
whole region. Based on our price jump analysis, such an
approach is rational in the case of the Visegrad stock markets,
which correspond to countries with closely connected econo-
mies and currencies. However, such a strategy does not appear
to be optimal for the entire region including the Turkish
market, since the economic links and price jump dynamics are
significantly different. Hence, a combination of assets from
diverse markets could be too heterogenous to be treated as a
consistent basket. In particular, the different risk profile and
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tency for the investor, as seen from different price jump
behaviors.
The regulators, on the other hand, should consider different
parameterizations of contagion effects and market panic for
mainland Europe and Turkey and not include Turkey into
existing European regional groups. Ignoring the above-
mentioned different risk profiles and contagion dynamics
would lead to themistreatment of systemic financial stability for
the entire European market. In addition, during the financial
crisis, the underestimation of the complexity of financial in-
stitutions seems to be one of the major causes of the global
market freeze. Our analysis, which focuses on the dynamics of
price jumps, provides proxy information for the distressed
period. In particular, the propagation of jumps across financial
systems mitigates the contagion. Its properties may be different
from the typical volatility spill-over effects and therefore an
efficient regulatory policy has to properly distinguish them.
Preparing for the contagion using tools calibrated to volatility
spill-over patterns would produce a false sense of safety: this
approach would in fact not only fail in the effect, but, due to the
complex nature of financial markets, it could even amplify the
contagion and worsen the crisis. Our paper thus points to the
direction that regulators should follow to draw proper regulatory
recommendations for suggesting efficient early warning sys-
tems that would prevent abundant losses.15 These recommen-
dations will become more and more important, as the economic
recovery after the European debt crisis and economic and
financial integration will progress.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the impact of the European debt
crisis on the volatility and especially the price jump intensity
in stock market indices reported by the set of stock exchanges
on the European continent. We employed data from the stock
exchanges of two developed (Frankfurt, London) and six
emerging (Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, Zagreb, Bucharest,
Ljubljana, Istanbul) markets during the period January 2008 to
June 2012.
It is rather obvious that even ex post identification of the price
jumps would depend on the actual method used, i.e., on the
employed price jump indicator. Therefore, one can conclude
that any analysis of jump distributions during financial distress
would bemethod-dependent.We use this apparent disadvantage
in potentially useful way: to distinguish between a significant
volatility increase and a change in price jump intensity. In order
to do so, we employ two methods to distinguish stock price
behavior from different perspectives. While Method 1 mini-
mizes the probability of false jump detection (the Type-II Error-
Optimal price jump indicator), Method 2 maximizes the prob-
ability of successful jump detection (the Type-I Error-Optimal
price jump indicator). It means that Method 2 identifies not only
price jumps but also periods with high volatility without any
price jump appearance.15 See Tsai (2013) and Ari (2012) for examples of the early warning systems.We employed both methods on a number of pairs of stock
market indices reported by several stock exchanges on Eu-
ropean continent. We tested a hypothesis that there was no
effect of the European debt crisis on the price jump intensity.
Our analysis suggests that Method 2, which captures both
price jumps and volatility, rejects the null hypothesis. A
number of mature and emerging markets show both
increased as well as increased levels of volatility during
financial distress. The results are limited by some lack of
statistical significance, though. In addition, we found that
differences in price intensity are less pronounced when using
Method 1, which focuses more on price jumps. From our
results notable exceptions stand out. The Ljubljana stock
market is clearly the market with the highest jump intensity,
especially during the European debt crisis period. The
Istanbul stock market exhibits higher jump intensity during
the crisis period than other markets (with the exception of
Ljubljana). To sum up, during the European debt crisis, the
intensity of jumps did not increase but the uncertainty
associated with the crisis transferred (only) to increased
volatility.
Further, we tested the hypothesis that the variance of price
jump intensities was different during the two periods.
Following Method 1, we show that the variance on all markets
taken together was lower in the period before the European
debt crisis. However, the results for most of the individual
markets are not statistically significant. On other hand, the
results based on Method 2 are statistically significant and show
lower variance during the pre-crisis period for the majority of
markets. Since Method 2 accounts not only for jumps but
volatility on markets as well, we based our overall conclusion
on Method 1 that filters out the over-volatile bias of Method 2.
Hence, disregarding a couple of exceptions, the variance of the
price jump intensity could not be distinguished as different in
the pre-crisis period from that during the crisis.
The regulatory consequences of our results can be linked to
the Basel approach to financial distress. First, there is a
common belief among risk practitioners and policy makers
that the intensity of price jumps does uniformly increases
during a period of financial distress. However, our results
indicate that this pattern does not correspond to stock market
behavior during a crisis. Second, there do exist differences in
price jump dynamics across stock markets. Hence, investors
have to model emerging and mature markets differently to
properly reflect their individual dynamics.References
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